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Early Korean Armies

Private Armies in the
Early Korean Military Tradition
(850-1598)

Samuel Bieler
From 850 to 1598, private armies were a critical feature of Korean
history. They buttressed the military government of the Ch’oe in the
late 1100s, usurped the Koryo Dynasty to make way for the rise of the
Chosen in 1392, and fought the Japanese invasion forces of Toyotomi
Hideyoshi during the Imjin War (1592-1598). They came from every
facet of Korean society: peasant resistance forces, retainers of noble
houses, and even contingents of Buddhist monks. Yet there has not
been a great deal of analysis of the conditions that gave rise to private
armies, nor whether in each conflict there were unique or similar
conditions that lent themselves to the formation of private military
forces in Korea during the different periods. Because these armies
were not a constant feature of Korean history, the question of why
certain eras witnessed the rise of private armies, while others did not,
requires a closer examination.
This paper argues that private armies in Korea formed as a response
to instabilities in the central government. As evidence, this paper looks
at those periods in which private armies arose in Korea and analyzes
the conditions (in the central government) during those times. There
are three distinct historical scenarios during which private armies arose:
when the central government was perceived as weak, when powerful
political actors in the Korean state attempted to protect and preserve
their existing power structure, and when foreign invasion overwhelmed
the central government’s ability to respond to these threats. By
organizing all the major instances of the formation of private armies
into a unified narrative of reaction to government weakness, the paper
will demonstrate that the common element in the creation of private
armies was an ineffective and unstable central government.
The first portion of the paper will be spent creating a clear
definition of private army based on the degree to which a military
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force is integrated into the formal power structure. Private armies—
unofficial military formations not integrated into the official structure
of the central government—will be distinguished from paramilitaries
who, though not regular soldiers, are part of the government power
structure. In order to illustrate this distinction, case studies from
historical and contemporary military forces will be utilized.
Defining Private Armies
In order to understand how private armies functioned in early
Korean society, it is first important to construct an effective definition
of what constitutes a private army. Casual observers often attach a
variety of labels to private armies without fully understanding them.
Phrases like “mercenary,” “militia,” and “paramilitary” are often
used interchangeably. This creates confusion and makes it difficult
to assemble various military forces into an organized narrative; terms
like “paramilitary” are substituted for both private and public armies
both general discourse and specialist literature with little explanation.
A review of historical military forces suggests that the best definition
of a private army is a military force outside the organizational and
command structure of a civil government. This definition effectively
separates the term “private armies” from other terms that may be
inappropriately applied to these private military organizations.
For an army to be private, it must be divorced from the public sphere
financially and structurally. The Peiyang Army of Yuan Shih-k’ai, a
Chinese private army, provides a useful example of the distinction
between public and private armies. Founded in 1901 by Yuan Shihk’ai, Governor of China’s Chihli province, the Peiyang Army has
been put forward as an example of a private army because of Yuan’s
great control over the army, his direct decision to create the force,
and his financing of some of its activities.1 Yet a closer look at the
Peiyang Army reveals that it was in many ways a public force. It was
expanded in size with the consent of the Empress Dowager of China,
the embodiment of the Chinese Central government, and it was raised
largely in response to the threat to China posed by the Russo-Japanese
War.2
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Throughout its existence, most of the money used to support this
force came from the central government in Peking, which continuously
bankrolled the expansion of this army.3 The government supported
this army because it carried out a legitimate public function: the
defense of Northern China against troubles in Manchuria.4 While the
Peiyang Army has been used as an example of a private army because
of Yuan’s high degree of personal control over it, by this paper’s
definition, the Peiyang army is not private army. The clarity supplied
by the definition in this example demonstrates its effectiveness. If
armies could be classified as private based on the autocratic command
of their leader, the term “private army” would become so broad as to
be useless: all armies of charismatic commanders with any degree of
autonomy would be swept up into the definition. A review of private
armies that does fit the definition, the private forces common to the
Roman Republic, are instructive of what private armies, defined for
the purposes of this paper, look like.
Private armies, disconnected from any formal state control,
flourished during the Roman Republic. Roman private armies, like
those of Pompey, were raised without the use of state coffers, by
private citizens like Pompey5 who lacked the kind of formal titles Yuan
possessed. These private armies could be small in scale, gladiators
and beast-fighters purchased for use against personal opponents
in Rome. Or, they could be as impressive as any formal army of
the Republic. Crassus, a famous Roman political figure, elegantly
captured the motivation behind raising these forces when he stated
that any politician should be able to pay for an army from his own
resources. Utilizing disgruntled veterans, Roman political actors put
together bodies of men with military experience to attack their rivals
or defend against attacks.6 These non-traditional armies of the Roman
Republic were private—commanded by private interests, paid for with
private funding, and working toward individual goals. They received no
support from the Roman treasury, and certainly were not raised to deal
with a threat to the Republic; their purpose was the aggrandizement of
the faction or leader who hired them. With this definition in place, it
is time to consider how different military forces relate to the definition
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of a private army.
Paramilitary forces, irregular forces controlled by the central
government, fall outside the definition of private armies. The term
“paramilitary” sweeps in a broad range of forces but can be accurately
described as professional supplements or substitutes for the military
government armies. Indonesian armies of 1948 provide an excellent
illustration of what paramilitary forces are and why they fall outside
the scope of private armies. The Indonesian military of 1948 was
comprised of a variety of different forces including troops raised in
the provinces of Indonesia and troops raised from different ethnic
groups and grouped into their own units.7 Indonesians referred to these
irregular troops as lasker, and they were formal parts of the army that
were noted on military organization charts, but they were not regular
soldiers with formalized training. They included armed battalions
of the Indonesian Socialist Youth and forces of political parties like
Suharto’s Peta party.8 Certainly, these forces often attempted to exert
political influence to deflect central government commands, but they
were a formal part of the army: when the military was considered
for reorganization, they were considered for reorganization. The
difference between paramilitary and private forces is thus clear:
paramilitary forces are recognized as an arm of the central government
and are (at least in theory) under its control, whereas governments
do not maintain pretensions to control private armies even if the
government formally acknowledges the existence of these forces. For
this reason, paramilitaries have a clear position in the public-private
army dichotomy.
While there is a clear difference between a private army and a public
army, the barrier that separates the two categories is not apparent
or permanent. A public army can easily become a private one if it
revolts against the central government. The colonial militias of Bahia,
Brazil are prime examples of this. The militias and the elites that led
them turned against the central colonial government, and militia units
formed the backbone of the army that won independence for Bahia
from the Portuguese. These militias proved more loyal to the elites who
led them than to the colonial government that raised them, and when
50
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revolution came, were accurately identified by historians as private
armies: “the militia Regiment of Torre, [was] virtually the private army
of the great Pires de Carvalho e Albuquerque clan.”9 When the war
for independence was successful and a new civil central government
was formed, the militias were integrated into this new government
and became vital in suppressing revolts against the newly established
regime.10 They were public armies once more.
A case study of Melanesian armed forces serves as an excellent
illustration both of the definition of private and public armies, and of
a review of the different types of forces described. The Pacific Islands
of the Melanesian region (Fiji, Vanuatu, etc.) maintain a variety of
different military forces: Fiji and Papua New Guinea maintain regular
military armies. Vanuatu on the other hand, maintains a paramilitary
Police Field Force. These are not professional military troops as seen
on the other islands, but rather more heavily armed police capable of
using military tactics; thus, by definition a public paramilitary force.11   A
coup in the Solomon Islands in 2000 utilized police forces like these
but also a militia force, the Malaitan Eagle force. This militia had been
formed to protect the interests of one of the island’s peoples, the
Malatians, who had come under attack from another militia force, the
Isatabu Freedom Force. Both of these groups would be considered
private militias.12 Papua New Guinea has also seen the use of public
mercenary forces, when, in 1997, it contracted the mercenaries
companies Sandline International and Executive Outcomes to battle a
secessionist movement on the island of Bougainville, creating a public
mercenary army.13
Broadly speaking, three distinct types of private armies emerged
historically in Korea: private armies that supported rebellions against
inept governments, private armies that protected existing power
structures during periods of central government instability, and private
armies that sought to resist foreign invasion. While each of these
different types arose to achieve a specific goal, the causal factors in their
rise are the same in each case: weaknesses in the central government
created a climate in which it was necessary or favorable for private
military forces to be available. This trend is apparent from the first
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use of widespread private armies in Korea during the eight century.
These forces were to support the rebellions that erupted because of
the military vacuum created by the collapse of the Silla government.
Private Armies in Rebellion
The Unified Silla government ruled a united Korea from about 670
until 935, but as Silla’s power declined and eventually collapsed, private
military forces emerged to fill the power vacuum. Silla began to face
internal discord as early as the reign of King Hyegong (r. 765-780). By
767, the Korean aristocracy had become increasingly powerful and
was able to counter reforms designed to lessen their power. As the
aristocracy grew in strength, the position of the monarch became
increasingly tenuous, so much so that in the last 155 years of the Unified
Silla kingdom, as many as twenty kings may have held the throne.14 As
the political structure weakened, so did the clan system—which had
been crucial to Silla’s stability— as well as much of the cultural, social,
and political framework that had allowed the Unified Silla to maintain
their power. Soon, the effective control of the central government was
reduced to the immediate region around the capitol.15 The dominion
of the private armies existed beyond this perimeter.
King Hyegong’s reign saw the rise of private armies utilized for
rebellion against the state. In 767, a rebel army composed of the private
forces of aristocrats and Korean clan chiefs forced Hyegong to repeal
a number of reforms that weakened their power.16 The success of
such privatization had repercussions realized in the following century,
dealing a serious blow to central government power in Korea. During
the early part of the ninth century, Korea began to witness the more
widespread use of private armies. Powerful local families called “castle
lords” or songju controlled population centers with troops based
inheir personal fortifications. Historical records also register them as
“generals” or changgun because they used these villages and cities to
raise their personal armies. Because of the lack of power of the central
magistrates sent to administer these regions, it was possible for local
lords commanding these private armies to usurp central government
control so as to exploit peasants for taxes and corvee (conscripted)
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labor.17 As the central government continued to deteriorate, local
strongmen, (hojok) and warlords began to form semi-independent fiefs
within what was ostensibly Silla territory.18 These generals maintained
private armies, though at the time of their formation in the latter part
of the ninth century, the armies were not yet strong enough to force
the central government from their territory.19   These nascent private
armies would play a crucial role to the government’s downfall.
With Silla unable to combat the proliferation of private armies, it
was perhaps inevitable that these forces would eventually multiply
and grow stronger. By the late 800s, heavy taxes from local lords had
contributed to the formation of new private armies in the form of
large bandit groups throughout the kingdom.20 Drawing from the
ranks of peasants and slaves that the central government could no
longer control, these brigands grew into significant armed forces. With
bandits destabilizing the country, warlords banded together for
defensive purposes, joining together their smaller private armies
to create a formidable force.21 In 892, a private rebel army turned
public when it defeated the central government’s attempts to prevent
it from forming the Kingdom of Later Paekche. This phenomenon
was repeated in 901 with the formation of the Kingdom of Later
Korguyo, which, in its later incarnation of the Kingdom of Koryo,
finally overthrew the Silla in 936. The inadequate administration of the
central Unified Silla government provided the initial power vacuum
that private armies would fill with a vengeance.
Myoch’ong’s 1135 revolt serves as another example of how
the government’s political frailty triggered the creation of private
armies (of revolt). Nine years before Myoch’ong raised an army of
revolution, the Koryo government had faced another revolt against the
throne. At the time of rebellion, the government was bitterly divided
between two political factions arguing for different responses to the
external threat of the Nurchen Tartars: the monk Myoch’ong headed a
faction supporting the movement of the capital to the more defensible
P’yongyang, while old noble families residing with the King wished
to retain the old capital.22 This call for movement was itself a sign of
weakness. It has been postulated that while Myoch’ong’s motives for
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Fall of Ch’ongju to the Righteous Army of Cho Hon and the
warrior monks under Yonggyu, “Shrine of the Seven Hundred.” Source: Stephen R. Turnbull, The Samurai Invasion of Korea: 1592 - 98. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2008.
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moving were pure, the political faction backing him may have been
using the move as a basis for the seizure of power.23 When it became
clear that the king would not move the capital as Myoch’ong desired,
Myoch’ong used P’yongyang’s well resources to launch a revolt again
the king.24
While factional struggle had sufficiently debilitated the government to
lead to the rise of a private army, the creation of (the army itself) proved
a unifying factor. Myoch’ong called the army he raised “the HeavenlySent Force of Loyalty and Righteousness” and attempted to use his
new army to resolve the issue of the capital move by force.25   However,
the chaos caused by the use of a private army allowed the faction in
support of retaining the capital in its previous location to mobilize
the forces of the central government in their defense. Supporters of
the move were promptly executed, and a government army marched
on P’yongyang.26 Accounts of the army’s success in the field vary,
with some historians suggesting the rebels were crushed in as little as
one month27, while others believe the army held out for as much as a
year.28 Regardless, the defeat of Myoch’ong’s rebellion demonstrated
that while the weakness and division of the central government led to
the formation of private armies, the unification and strength of that
same government could put an end to them.
Private armies of rebellion also arose from the defection of forces
previously loyal to the government as the famous rebellion of the
Sambyolch’o against the Koryo-Mongol government demonstrates. As
a paramilitary police division of the Ch’oe-controlled Koryo
government (1198-1258), the Sambyolch’o or “Three Elite Patrols”
were a national paramilitary force entrusted with police functions.29
These soldiers, originally tasked with suppressing violent youth gangs
throughout the military, were a thoroughly public force supported and
paid for by the state treasury.30 When the Mongols invaded Korea in
six massive incursions from 1231-1359,31 the Sambyolch’o led the Ch’oe
government’s resistance to the Mongol invasion. Utilizing ambushes
and harrying strikes, the Sambyolch’o was the primary Ch’oe response to
the Mongol invasion; they served as a private army dedicated to resisting
the Mongol advance. When the Ch’oe shadow dictatorship fell in 1258
Penn History Review
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and the reinstated king surrendered to the Mongols, the Sambyolch’o
turned on the central government and initiated a revolt.32 The turmoil
within the central government together with the capitulation of the
king to the Mongols opened the door to a political overthrow
Starved and depleted by Mongol invasion, the Ch’oe-run Koryo
government was in a delicate state. By the time the Ch’oe were facing
the fifth Mongol invasion, it was already crippled from previous
attacks: the state treasury was empty, and famine was so dire that
the government and private granaries had to distribute grain to the
public twice in a single year.33 Nor did the government’s troubles
end when it capitulated to the Mongols. The new king, Wongjong,
was nearly dethroned in 1269 and had to be restored to power by the
Mongols—the first time in Korean history that a Korean king was
saved by a foreign power.34 But for the intervention of the Mongols,
the Sambyolch’o rebellion might have proven successful.
Once in revolt, the Sambyolch’o behaved as a private army of rebellion,
striking out at a variety of different government targets. Initially, they
blocked all access between the central government-controlled island of
Kanghwa where the government had fled during the Mongol invasion
and the mainland,35 possibly in an attempt to derail the government’s
return to the mainland and collaboration with the Mongols.36 When
this failed, the Sambyolch’o dragooned the remaining inhabitants of
Kanghwa into a forced migration to support their base of operations at
the southern end of the Korean Peninsula. From this base, they quickly
seized control of thirty islands in the area and forced the Mongols
to divert crucial resources to dealing with this large-scale rebellion.
After an initial offensive ground to a halt, a combined Mongol-Koryo
force was formed that dislodged the Sambyolch’o from their main base
at Chindo, driving them to the island of Cheju, and then to final defeat
in 1273. The Sambyolch’o held off the Mongol armies for four years.37
While this rebellion against the central government proved to be a
failure, private armies of rebellion would rise again during times of
government weakness, and they would play a key role in the formation
of the last Korean dynasty.
By the end of the Koryo dynasty, the central government faced a
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plethora of internal and external problems that provided fertile ground
for the development of private armies. One of the main problems
the principle government faced was the continuing raids by external
enemies. In 1359 and 1361, a Han Chinese rebel group, the Red
Turbans, launched large-scale raids into Korea. The second invasion of
1361 succeeded in capturing the Korean capital. The king was forced
to flee the city, and those buildings that survived the Mongol onslaught
crumbled during the Red Turban invasion.38 Equally troublesome was
a resurgence in raids by the Japanese Wako, or pirates. These seaborne
raiders struck at villages along the Koryo coastline and had an impact
greatly disproportionate to their numbers and armaments, driving
peasants away from the fertile costal territories. The random nature of
their raids also crippled maritime trade and prevented local taxes from
reaching the capital, placing the aristocracy in danger of economic
collapse.39 But additional factors besides external raids undermined
the central government.
Corrupt governance was a key element in the disintegration of the
Koryo dynasty. By the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1351-1374), Koryo
power was concentrated in the hands of a set of powerful families
who used the government for personal aggrandizement. Koryo Sa, a
contemporary record of the time notes that in searching for a new
advisor, Kongmin believed “that the aristocratic officials and great
families were linked in personal cliques, mutually protecting each
other…Since these three groups were unsuitable for employment the
king had to obtain a man of independence who had abandoned the
secular world and use him extensively to correct the abuses of the
past.”40 Kongmin chose the monk Sin Ton, who began an extensive
campaign of land reform while ousting many aristocrats from their
positions. While this led the general population to adore and even
revere Sin Ton as a saint, it drew the ire of the great families and both
Sin Ton and Kongmin were soon killed.41 As devastating to the stability
of the government as the external raids and internal corruption were,
it was the political upheaval of another country that put into place the
mechanism by which private armies would found a new dynasty.
A new political order rose in China during the waning days of
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Koryo: the Yuan dynasty was slowly collapsing and the Ming Dynasty
ascended. In 1368, Chu Yuan-chang founded the new Ming dynasty
and continued to battle with the remnants of the Yuan dynasty,
requesting the aid of the Koryo. This broke the court into two factions,
one supporting the Mongol Yuan dynasty, and the other supporting
the Chinese Ming dynasty.42 When the king instituted a pro-Mongol
policy, he was deposed by two powerful generals, Ch’oe Yong, and
Yi Song-gye. The new court decided on a strike at the territorial
expansion of the Ming in the North and appointed Ch’oe Yong to lead
the expedition with Yi Song-gye as one of his deputies.43 It was in this
chaotic environment that Yi Song-gye and his private army launched
their rebellion.
Yi Song-gye had been cultivating his private army since his early
military campaigns. When the Koryo marched against the Red Turbans
in 1362, 2,000 of the 200,000 soldiers were Yi Song-gye’s private
troops. Korean military officials serving as Inspecting Marshals (Wonsu)
maintained their own recruits and troop rosters (p’aegi) and Yi Song-gye
in his capacity as a Wonsu assiduously cultivated his forces until he was
the most powerful political actor.44 Furthermore, he disagreed with
the planned attack on the Ming and when ordered to march on them
in 1388, subverted his fellow deputy, Cho Min-Su, and entered into
rebellion.45 Marching his rebel army away from the Yalu River at the
border of China and Korea, he deposed Ch’oe Yong and the reigning
king, U, in a near bloodless coup. A few puppet kings followed until
1392 when Yi Song-gye disposed of all pretenses and made himself
king, marking the beginning of the Chosen dynasty.46 The private
army of rebellion had ushered in a new order.
The later actions of Yi Song-gye demonstrate that private armies
were important actors in early Korean history, not a constant feature.
Strong Korean central governments would actively work to reduce the
presence of private armies throughout the kingdom. King T’aejong
(r. 1400-1418), one of Yi’s successors ordered the abolition of
private armies and armed retainers47 and by 1400 AD, this was carried
through. Private armies were either abolished entirely or merged into
the burgeoning national army.48 This army was an entirely public force
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organized under the auspices of the national command. Later, this
public military control was strengthened when King Sejo (r. 1455-1468)
established a series of large military garrisons and arms production
centers in every province. 49 While private armies would arise later in
response to weaknesses in the Chosen government, during this period,
the government was sufficiently strong to occasion no need for private
military forces, and the government made a point to disband any
potential private armed force.
Private Armies Protecting Central Power
While private armies might be used to usurp the existing political
order, they could just as easily be used by Korea’s political elites, those
already integrated into the power structure, to protect and strengthen
their status and positions when the political elites felt the central
government incapable of or unwilling to protect their interests. A
small but important example of this trend during the Koryo period
was the private armies of Buddhist temples. Buddhist temples, though
centers of religious activity, were also concentrations of great wealth
and political power. The Koryo king granted these temples both slaves
and land, as did other royal family members and aristocrats seeking
to obtain blessings and happiness from Buddha. These donations
accumulated until temples were powerful landlords who organized
their own industries to produce weapons for the private armies they
developed to protect their interests.50 These private armies of combattrained monks were used when the central government was unable
to protect the temples’ interests. This could occur when aristocratic
infighting created enough instability that the temples felt the need to
support a candidate to protect their interests. But it could also happen
when the central government needed assistance protecting Korea, and
by extension temple property, from outside invasion. This materialized
on a number of occasions: an army of warrior monks called the Subdue
Demons Corps was mobilized to fight off the Jurchen invasions of
Korea51, and the monk Kim Yun-hu was responsible for forcing the
Mongols to withdraw in 1232 after killing their commander Sartaq at
the battle of Ch’oin-song.52 It was under Yi-Cha-gyom in the twelfth
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century however, that these private armies were used more frequently.
Yi Cha-gyom was a member of the powerful Yi clan during a period
of central government power. At this time, the Koryo dynasty was
threatened by the Kin Empire of the Nurchen Tartars. Using highly
mobile cavalry, the Nurchen tribes began attacking Koryo troops in
1109. These attacks split the Koryo court into opposing factions, some
suggesting accommodation with the Kin Empire, others demanding
a military confrontation.53 A power struggle also existed between
Koryo’s aristocratic families: the Kim clan, which had previously
enjoyed a monopoly on power, was facing deteriorating influences as
Yi-Cha-gyom’s Yi clan rose to monopolize power from 1046-1122
in part by supplying queens to seven different kings. To compound
issues, the monarchy of Koryo, the heart of the central government,
was in a dramatically enervated state: Yi Cha-gyom had engineered
the removal of one king in 1122 and replaced him with the king’s
grandson.54 Yi was able to do this largely because of the increasing
prominence of private armies of the great clans, which were used to
protect and advance the families’ interests.
It was in the time of Yi Cha-gyom that private armies became key
means by which the great families of Korea, key political actors, protected
their interests. Yi pioneered the formation of private armies. With
the backing of the military hero Ch’ok Chun-gyong and his forces, Yi
began driving political opponents from office and increasing the Yi
clan land holdings until they held the dominant position of power in
the Koryo dynasty. At this point, however, Yi Cha-gyom’s ambition
grew too great, and he attempted open rebellion against the king,
transitioning his private army of protection to one of rebellion. His
attempt failed55, but a trend had been set. After Yi Cha-gyom’s use of
private armies to usurp power, great families began to use their private
armies not just for protection but also to strengthen their positions
by collecting “taxes” from peasants, either with the cooperation of
government officials or in defiance of them. The success of these
private armies increased their use, and they became a defining feature
of the period of instability from 1170 onward, with their origins in the
era of Yi Cha-gyom.56 These private armies, called sabyong,57 were not
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in open revolt against the government, and did not attempt to replace
the existing political order with a new power structure. But they did
allow the political elite of these families to be selective in determining
which government orders to obey. While Yi Cha-gyom would pioneer
the art of the private army as a tool for of political power, the Ch’oe
house would be the most effective practitioner of this art.
Among the great families of mid-Koryo Korea, the Ch’oe stand out
for their use of the private army to protect and enhance their political
power, effectively operating as a shadow government during a time of
central government weakness. In 1170, a coup deposed King Uijong
and sent him into exile. This was the catalyst for revolts thoughout
the country when the private armies described above took hold of
the nation.58 Rebellion spread even to the capital when in 1198 a slave
named Manjok attempted to rise up against the recent coup of Ch’oe
Chu’unghon. The Koryo Sa records his intentions:
We will start from the hallways of Hungguk Monastery and
go to the polo grounds. Once all are assembled and start to
beat drums and yell, the eunuchs in the palace will certainly
respond. The public slaves will take control of the palace by
force, and we will stage an uprising inside the capitol, first
killing Ch’oe Ch’unghon and others. If each slave will kill his
master and burn the slave registers, there will be no people of
humble status in the country, and we can all become nobles,
generals, and ministers.59
The rebellion was crushed, but this kind of instability at the
heart of the central government was indicative of the weakness present
when Ch’oe Ch’ungon took tacit power and replaced King Myongjong
with the king’s brother Sinjong in 1196.60 As the new power behind
the throne, the Ch’oe would continue to use their private armies to
safeguard their position as the power behind the Koryo throne.
The Ch’oe and other powerful families used their private armies during
this period to protect themselves and stabilize their positions. They did
not, however, attempt to eliminate the central government: they did not
renounce the monarchy, and they accepted the established government
system; but the might of Ch’oe private armies assured that Ch’oe
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dignitaries were “consulted” by state officials in important government
matters.61 This co-existence with the state is corroborated by the
continued presence of dynastic state troops of the central government,
whose numbers made them an important asset in protecting the rest
of Korea, in addition to lessening the security and patrol demands
of the private armies of the Ch’oe. These forces existed at the whim
of the Ch’oe, who effectively controlled all government policy, but
were public troops supported by central government revenue.62 With
the forces of the central government still in place, the Ch’oe could
concentrate on the organization and development of their own private
armies.
Private Ch’oe armies took a number of different forms. While the
sabyong of powerful families were common in this period, a number
of other factions comprised the Ch’oe forces. Many of the Ch’oe
forces were called retainers or mungaek. These were armed followers,
developed during the 1170 coup when military leaders surrounded
themselves with small groups of security. Ch’oe Ch’unghon expanded
on this until his group of “personal retainers” numbered in the
thousands.63 Other Ch’oe leaders raised their own forces of personal
retainers. Koryo Sa documents a struggle that arose between the Ch’oe
brothers Ch’ungsu and Ch’ungon who engaged their retainers in what
could more properly be described as a small war:
General O Sukpi, Chun Chonsim, Pak Chongbu, and other
said ‘We are your retainers because you have great potential
to sway the world. Now if you, on the contrary, become a
coward like this, it will mean the extermination of us and
our clans.’…Ch’ungsu agreed to this. At dawn he led more
than one thousand followers and camped at the crossroads…
Coordinating their troop formations they [Ch’unghon’s forces]
attacked the front and the rear. Armed with the great horned
bows from the royal arsenal, archers fired arrows so they fell
like rain.64
While private Ch’oe forces did occasionally skirmish with one another
like this, the armies spent most of their time protecting the political
position of the Ch’oe.
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Personal and national protection and tax collection were the
primary functions of private military forces like the Ch’oe’s during
this period. Large numbers of Ch’oe soldiers were assigned to protect
Ch’oe private palaces and escort Ch’oe dignitaries; the army from
which the Ch’oe drew for this purpose soon grew from 3,000 soldiers
to more than ten times this size.65   On a more minor scale, Koryo Sa
tells of how an official used his own private army for protection: “In
fear, Kyong Taesung gathered a suicide corps of some one hundred
and ten people. Stationing them at his home to deal with any incident,
he called them the Personal Security Force.”66 Ch’oe armies also
mobilized for national protection. If the central government fell, so
would their political power. Thus, Ch’oe troops sometimes fought
alongside government soldiers who, as Korya Sa tells, were in clear
need of the assistance: “At this time they were about to send troops
to defend against the Khitans. The bravest soldiers were all Ch’oe
Ch’unghon’s and U’s retainers. Those in the government army were
all thin and weak and useless.”67 These mobilizations of private Ch’oe
armies to protect Ch’oe political interests were most apparent during
the Ch’oe struggle with the Mongols.
During the war against the Mongols, Ch’oe forces fought the
Mongols vigorously, though they did so to protect the Ch’oe power
structure, not the central government. As the Mongols closed in on
the capital in 1231, Ch’oe troops put up a more effective resistance
than the government troops not only because they were better trained,
but also because the capital was where their homes were, the royal
troops had less connection to the city. Additionally, the Ch’oe were
fearful that if the Mongols managed to defeat them, the Mongols
would retain the king as a puppet but drive the Ch’oe from power, just
as the Ch’oe had done in 1198.68 But when the choice came whether
to actually defend the capital or to withdraw, the Ch’oe actions were
a clear reminder that these were private armies raised to protect Ch’oe
political positions: Ch’oe U called his well-trained private troops to
protect him as he withdrew, leaving boys and weak government troops
to defend the capital.69 While this was a dramatic example of how
Ch’oe private armies always acted for Ch’oe, more mundane examples
Penn History Review

63

Early Korean Armies

of their support of Ch’oe political power exist.
Tax collection and land acquisition were second functions of the
private armies of both the Ch’oe and their contemporaries. Prominent
generals and landholders used their retainers to seize land and taxes from
the peasants. The Ch’oe were particularly skilled at this—all revenue
from the entire Chunju region of Korea was diverted to them. This
safeguarded their power by funding both their private army and official
salaries the weakened central government could not pay.70 Forgotten
in this land grab were the peasants who suffered immensely under the
abuses of the private armies not only of the Ch’oe, but also of other
landlords who could be equally or even more cruel and avaricious than
the Ch’oe armies. Koryo Sa documents one such case of abuse:
Kim Injun set up numerous estates and had his retainer Mun
Songju control those in Cholla and retainer Chi Chun control
those in Ch’ungch’ong. They competed in extorting wealth
by giving peasants one peck of rice seed for planting, for
which they collected one bushel of rise at harvest. All his sons
imitating this, competed in assembling hoodlums and relied on
their power to seize people’s property without restraint. The
grievances against them were rampant.71
Private armies such as these solidified the Ch’oe political
position by guaranteeing them resources and providing the protection
needed to defeat armed challenge. Using private armies for this
purpose would persist after the demise of the Koryo and into the Yi
dynasty.
The year 1395 proved to turbulent for the T’aejo king of the Yi
dynasty. The Ming emperor Ming T’ai Tzu was notoriously sensitive
about the wording of a diplomatic missive sent to him and demanded
that its writer, Chong To Chon, be handed over to the Ming
Court. Chong had been a central figure in the T’aejo government
and his departure so infuriated the court that they considered war
against the Ming, putting troops on alert. The death of Ming T’ai
Tzu in 1398 broke the diplomatic impasse, but considerable chaos was
created.72 Adding to this tension was a growing feud about which royal
heir would succeed the throne. Yi Pang Won, the monarch’s fifth son,
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had his sights on the throne, but found his brothers stood in the way.73
This became especially true when one of Won’s half brothers, Pang
sok, was named crown prince instead of him. A sudden bout of illness
in King T’aejo provided Pang Won with the final element of central
government weakness he needed to act.74 Private armies would once
again protect the interests of an established political actor.
Pang Won moved decisively with his forces to protect his political
position. Using a private army he had amassed, he struck against
both of his half brothers and eliminated both of them, as well as
the returned Chong To Chon, whom the king had entrusted with the
education of the crown prince. Having removed these threats to his
position, Pang Won was able to oversee the placement of the eldest
of the Yi brothers, Pang Kwa, to the monarchy.75 It is important to
note that Pang Won did not use his army to put himself on the throne,
but simply to protect his status against an unsuitable (in his view)
king. In fact, unlike the Koryo dynasty, all the private armies clashing
in support of succession struggles were supporting family claimants
to the throne, not outsiders. Indeed, these were the ultimate “political
insiders,” connected by ties of blood to the monarchy.76 They did not
seek to rebel and create a new government but simply to assume a
higher position within the current government. It is also worth noting
that when the succession struggles were over and the central army
had regained its power, the private armies were disbanded; they could
exist only with a weak central government.77 But private armies were
not always in competition with the government: when outside forces
threatened a weak Korea, private armies sprung up to support the
embattled central government.
Private Armies Versus Foreign Invaders
The Mongol invasion met stout resistance, but the Ch’oe government
faced endless waves of reinforcements that eventually broke the
central government’s power to resist, leading private armies to attempt
to fill the resulting security gap. Even before the Mongol invasion, the
Koryo had been experiencing increasing issues with border raiders, as
Mongol letters to the central government reveal: “In the Year of the
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Rat when the Black Khitan invaded, you were not able to properly
get rid of them. We sent two people, Jala and Qacin. They came
leading the army, took the Black Khitan and killed them all. You
they did not kill. We came, for if we had not dealt with the Black
Khitan, you would not have been soon [in doing it]. Isn’t it so?”78
Using the pretext of an emissary murdered in 1219, the Mongols
severed relations with the Koryo, and in 1231, they invaded. Under
attack, Koryo and Ch’oe quietly accepted Mongol rule, integrating
themselves into the Mongol tribute system.79 This system diluted the
authority of the central government, whose king now had to accept
Mongol advisors and consorts who stirred trouble in the court. Tax
burdens also became increasingly severe as commoners were crushed
under a conflicting mass of landlord, central government, and Mongol
taxes.80 When these taxes became too onerous, the central government
attempted revolt, only to abandon the mainland entirely in 1232 to
fight the Mongol occupation from Kanghwa Island. The population
of mainland Korea was left to fend for itself.81  Without support from
the central government, private armies rose as the people of Korea
attempted to fight the invaders.
The Mongol occupation drove the formation of numerous private
armies seeking to defeat the invaders. The role of the Buddhist and
Ch’oe private armies has already been discussed, but they were not the
only groups to strike against the invaders. These private armies arose
from a number of different sources: bandits in hiding on Mt. Kwanak
turned themselves in and began a struggle against the Mongols;
peasants retreated to costal islands and mountain fortresses and
fought on; and under Chi Kwang-su a slave army defended the town
of Ch’unju, fighting to the end despite the fact that all the aristocratic
officials fled.82 Koryo Sa takes particular note of this struggle, which
combined the private army of slaves with the private army of the
Ch’oe: “When the Mongol troops arrived, Chongju and Hongik, along
with the yangban (aristocrat officials), abandoned the town. The slave
army and the Mixed Special Patrol Troops combined their strength
and repulsed the Mongols.”83 Private armies acting in the absence of
the central government would be a prominent feature in attempts to
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A Japanese patrol is ambushed and pelted with stones and arrows. Source: Stephen R. Turnbull, The Samurai Invasion of Korea:
1592 - 98. Oxford: Osprey Publ., 2008. 48.
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combat another constant danger to Korea, the Wako.
Wako, pirate raiders, were a perennial problem for Korea, surfacing
whenever a weakness was detected in the central government. The
first Wako raids occurred in 1223 AD, and they would continue
intermittently for three centuries after that,84 though other pirates that
had not borne the formal title of Wako existed before this. While
the Koreans attributed all these raids to Japanese pirates, Wako were
actually a variety of peoples who engaged in part-time piracy. This
non-professional nature did not make them any less deadly: their
raids forced peasants inland and caused the best costal farmland
to fall into disuse while interrupting the flow of costal taxes to the
government.85 They might also be sponsored by “sea lords,” local
dignitaries who might support their activities in order to profit from
them,86 especially when impotent Korean governments were forced
to pay the Wako off to avoid their raids.87 This would be a continual
problem for Korea but would become especially acute during the
Mongol occupation.
Official incompetence and Mongol regulations combined to make
the Wako raids during the fourteenth century particularly devastating
and spurred the rise of private armies to protect Korean territory. By
1350, Wako raids were becoming especially debilitating because Korea,
used to the protection of the Mongols, found that the Mongol Yuan
dynasty was desperately attempting to suppress rebellions in China
and could send only a few weapons and no troops. Additionally,
Mongol edicts in 1278 and 1337 forbade the Koreans from building
warships and from keeping weapons, respectively. These provisions
crippled the Koreans’ ability to stave off the Wako.88 In addition to its
military shortcomings, the Koryo central government was crippled by
the tribute requirements placed on it by the Mongols. The power and
prerogatives of the king were circumscribed, draining the authority
of the central government.89 Without the protection of the central
government, it fell to Yi Song-gye to defend his territories from the
Wako. Yi’s private army would eventually rebel against the central
government, but during the 1380s, his private army, initially formed
to fight the Red Turban bandits, would be effectively turned on the
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Wako.90 While Yi would disband private armies when he took power,
they would return to play a vital role in repulsing another foreign
invader every bit as dangerous as the Mongols and the Wako; the 1592
invasion of Japanese leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi.
Much like the Mongol invasions, the Japanese invasion quickly
crippled the forces of the central Korean government, assaulting
Korea’s shores with overwhelming force. On May 23, 1592, acting under
orders from Japanese Taiko, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Konishi Yukinaga
and So Yoshitoshi landed at Pusan with 700 ships, the vanguard of
the most formidable invasion force in the world.91 Highly professional
from years of civil war and equipped with state of the art muskets
and artillery, the invasion army of Hideyoshi was the largest and best
armed in the world. With 158,800 men in the initial expeditionary
force, it dwarfed the Spanish Armada’s 30,000 men. With advanced
arquebuses, it was far more sophisticated than the poorly armed Ming
army, the only force that could come close to matching it in size.92 It
is questionable how many nations could have effectively resisted this
onslaught but Korea faced particular difficulties. By the sixteenth
century, Korea’s military was sub-par and quickly collapsed in the face
of Japanese attacks. Following one battle, the Koreans reported of
the Japanese, “The enemy we faced today could be called immortal
soldiers. Normal men can’t stand up to them in battle.”93 Korean forces
were driven back and the king, Sonjo, was forced to flee city after city
until he and his court were a mere 150 miles from the Chinese border,
and contemplating abandoning Korea for China altogether. With the
forces of the central government in retreat, it fell to the people of
Korea to resist the invasion, and as during the time of the Mongols,
private armies responded.
As in the Mongol invasion, private armies assisting the central
government in repulsing the Japanese came from a variety of sources
and were led by a panoply of colorful characters. These private forces
were called uibyong, or righteous armies, and many were raised by local
aristocrats or landowners who had the wealth necessary to outfit these
forces.94 These were the armies of men like Kwak Chae-u, also called
“Heaven Descending Red Coat General” for the red garments he wore,
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dyed with the first menstrual blood of girls. Raising an army of one
thousand soldiers paid for out of his own money, Kwak led his army
on raids against the Japanese throughout Kyongsang province. His
private army was far more dedicated to the war against the Japanese
than were the government soldiers that sometimes accompanied
him. During their siege of Kumsan, when the Japanese opened fire,
the government soldiers broke and ran even as Kwak’s men held,
thus costing him the battle.95 While Kwak’s exploits were particularly
famous, his story, that of an upper-class aristocrat raising a personal
force to fight the Japanese, was repeated throughout many Korean
provinces. These forces eventually crippled Japan’s ability to effectively
exploit and occupy Korea. Additionally, Buddhist monks joined the
battle against the Japanese. No longer the political force they had
been during the Koryo dynasty, there were no temple-based private
armies, but eight thousand monks rose to answer the monk Hyujong’s
impassioned call to arms:
“Hold high your banners, all you monk-soldiers of the eight
provinces! Who among you have not been given birth by the
land…Abandoning a just cause and swerving from the right
path in order merely to survive in hiding-how can this be the
proper way?”96
These private forces would be a constant thorn in the side of
the Japanese, crippling occupational governments and cutting supply
lines, providing Korea and China with the precious time they needed
to build their strength and gather the government forces necessary to
repulse the Japanese. The private armies of resistance gave Korea its
freedom.
Conclusion
This paper does not, and could not provide a canonical list of the
private armies that existed during Korea’s long history. What this paper
has tried to do is provide a framework for understanding the conditions
under which private armies in Korea arose, and a methodology for
organizing these armies into a coherent narrative by giving a clear
definition of private armies and creating a typology that allows for their
organization. To this end examples have been provided of a diverse
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array private armies throughout early Korean history, and it has been
demonstrated that central government weakness was the catalyst in
each of these cases for the creation of these private armies. A perfect
example are the forces bearing the name uibyong resurfaced in the late
1800s and early 1900s when the Japanese again attempted to invade
and occupy Korea. These forces reemerged hundreds of years after the
examples provided here but arose in response to central government
weakness to Japanese invasion. This suggests that these private armies
had not only political and military effects on Korean history, but also
an impact on the national imagination and consciousness.
From this starting point there are a super-abundance of avenues for
future research on this topic. There are many more private armies in
Korean history against which the robustness of this theory can be
tested. Just as importantly, the definition of private army itself can be
examined and refined. All of this will serve to better illuminate the
catalysts for the creation of private armies and define the pivotal role
these forces played in Korean history.
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